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ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE "BRAVE NEW
WORLD" OF DEVELOPMENT*
Paul H. Brietzke'"

Rip Van Winkle, whose experiences are echoed in myths
throughout the Third World, slept for decades and awoke to find
a New York State he never made or even knew. If we imagine a
Rip who became an expert (always a risky thing to become) in
development before snoozing for, say, two decades, he would now
awake in a Brave New World:
Command economies are unworkable; only free markets can provide
incentives for growth and development. That is today's conventional
wisdom as Poland, Hungary and even the Soviet Union lurch toward
private enterprise. It has been the rationale .for many years as the
International Monetary Fund along with the World Bank has required
the governments of poor countries to liberate their markets as a
condition for continuing aid.1

It was almost two decades ago when, learning that I was
researching law and development in Ethiopia, Professor Tony
Allott remarked: "little law and less development." His comment
stung my (then-)youthful enthusiasm, but it is perhaps a fitting
epitaph for the 1970s and 1980s.
The often-bitter fruit of a Brave New World has grown out of
two decades of disenchantment with developmental failures
worldwide, failures that are both causes and effects of a militant
neo-conservativism. One book with a title which could describe
the "development" efforts in many places, Tropical Gangsters,
shows how Equatorial Guinea became
.

Presented to the Law and Development in the 1990s Conference, Windsor, England,
30 May -1 June 1990.
" Professor of Law, Valparaiso University (U.S.A.).
1. Wallich, TheAnalytical Economist: Markets Unbound?, SclentificAmerican, Nov. 1989,
p. 80. I hope the reader treats my pun as intended; Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (1932)
was not a very nice place to live, chiefly because politicians and technocrats were able to
convince most ordinary people of its desirable inevitability.
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one of the most hopeless economies on earth. Taken one by one,
many of the ministers he dealt with were both honest and competent,
Klitgaard says; but their country's history, and their degrading
relationships with international aid organizations tempted nearly all
of them to act in their own interests first. In Japan, those who have
sacrificed their own interests for the nation's welfare have been seen
as cultural heroes; whereas in the Philippines they have been easy
prey for the likes of the Marcoses

Worldwide, "ill-intentioned individuals can always be found to buy
the honesty of honorable politicians and bureaucrats," but the
problem grows more serious when a government intervenes more
extensively in the economy and society.3 A 1986 ILO Survey of
Ethiopia found an arrogance of power which exists throughout the
world:
"The interaction between the community and the
government appears.., to be bureaucratic in style, dominating
over people" and stifling initiative." Goren Hyden concludes that,
by hiding from the State in their "precapitalist economy of
affection," peasants were able to thwart the rural transformation
on which Tanzania (and many other countries) staked their
reputations as well as their economies.5
Examples could be multiplied endlessly. There has been a
worldwide decline in what might be called a developmental
morale; diminished opportunities and prospects have fomented
increased rent-seeking behavior (the extraction of unwarranted
benefits from government) almost everywhere; and a rising sense
of injustice and frustration has contributed to the policy failures
that eroded the credibility of policymaking processes. Elite
smugness and insecurity are both on the rise - a combination
which is dangerous for the poor and powerless. Unrealistic
planning targets have been poorly implemented. "Growth pole,"
"basic needs," and "institution building" (creating an overlay of
2. Fallows, Wake Up, America, New York Review of Books, Mar. 1, 1990, p. 14, discussing
Robert Klitgaard's Tropical Gangsters, forthcoming from Basic Books.
3. H. Lepage, Tomorrow, Capitalism 34 (S. Ogilvie, trans. 1982).
4. J. Harbeson, The Ethiopian Transformation 199 (1988) (quoting the ILO).
5. Id at 11, 202, 228 (discussing G. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (1980) and No
Shortcuts to Progress (1983)).
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new institutions which work little better than the ones they
supposedly replace or circumvent) strategies have been poorly
designed and/or blocked politically. Mechanisms of accountability
have regularly failed in their countries of origin, as well as in the
Third World countries to which they were transplanted: bills of
rights, judicial review, ministerial responsibility to parliament,
separation of powers, socialist legality, democratic
representativeness, committed cadres representing the proletariat,
and so forth.6
It is difficult to generalize, but the rising trend is for law to
take a back seat in a "new" growth economics that is a recycling
of the "old" growth economics only in part: "devaluation, removal
of [some, politically less sensitive] subsidies, privatization, cutbacks
in social services and Jin some countries] mass sacking of
Insurgent strategies like "another"
government employees."
development and the "right" to development seem all but
swamped by this neo-conservatism, which reinforces right-wing
intuitions with counterfactual speculations and the powerful logic
of a neoclassical economics.
While this theory has definite biases, against the poor (people
or countries) and governmental activism, it shares with other
economics theories a substantial ideological power of giving
political choices the appearance of neutral techniques. Kendall
and Louw can thus argue, presumably in good conscience, that a
"free-market liberalism" in a liberated South Africa requires
adoption of the Swiss Canton model: turning the existing 305
magistrates' districts into self-governing units. This would of
course prevent Africans from controlling South Africa, by making
it impossible for anyone to control it, yet Winnie Mandela, Alan
Paton, and Bayard Rustin have endorsed this nonsense. The
"notion that every country, whatever its history and circumstances,
6. l at 192-202; IL Nagatani, Political Macroeconomics 256 (1989); Fallows, supra note
2, at 16. See G. Meier, Emerging from Poverty 84-85, 107 (1984); Cline, Distribution and
Development, 1 J. Dev. Econ. 359, 375-76 (1975).
7. Nelson, Human Face 'Sweetens' Upside-down World of Global Economics, New Straits
Times [Malaysia], Mar. 15, 1988, p. 12.
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should have the same extremely limited government and the same
kind of freedom of enterprise is every bit as unrealistic, and
potentially as disastrous, as the contrary notion that centralized
state socialism is the only path to prosperity."
Unrealistic and disastrous it may be, but the full scope of this
neo-conservative agenda is perhaps best illustrated by the wild
popularity in the U.S. of Francis Fukuyama's End of History.9
From the weakest of beginnings - support for Hegel's notion that
history ended in 1806 - Fukuyama goes on to argue that "the
basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be
improved upon. The two World Wars... and their attendant
revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending these
principles spatially, such that the various provinces of human
civilization were brought up to the level of its most advanced
outposts
.."
Lenin, Mao, Nyerere, et al. were apparently
playing right into neo-conservative hands the whole time.
What makes the neo-conservatives think they can succeed
where Marxists, African Socialists, etc. have apparently failed?
Fukuyama's answer is that "we" have a superior ideology linked to
a universally popular "consumer culture" defined as "easy access
to VCRs and stereos." But can we end history by throwing VCRs
and stereos at it, especially among people who do not have a
house for their stereo or the electricity to plug it into? Fukuyama
does admit that "the vast bulk of the Third World remains very
8. Fredrickson, Can South Africa Change?, New York Rev. of Books, Oct. 26, 1989, pp.
48, 52-53, reviewing F. Kendall & L Louw. After Apartheid (1989). See H. Lepage, supra
note 3, at 31, 89; C. VeUanovski, The New Law and Economics 7-18, 13 (1982); Cooter, The
Best Right Laws: Value Foundationsof the Economic Analysis of Law, 64 Notre Dame L.Rev.
817, 833 (1989).
9. The National Interest (Summer 1989), p. 1.
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much mired in history,"10 but neo-conservative missionaries hope
to have it out of the muck soon.
Markets and Governments
"Dependence" theorists would rightly excoriate this neoconservative "funeral for social revolutions," this "eternal age of
capital""1 as developed by and for Thatcher's Britain, Kohl's
Germany, a Reagan-Bush America, and even Mitterand's France.
Future Second and Third World development "experts" are now
being trained to this neo-conservative canon, which seems to have
the diplomatic and financial muscle to get itself adopted in any
event. Past failures have dissipated the intellectual capital of
development studies, and the collapse of ostensibly Marxist
regimes has discredited Marxism itself - including the humane
and revolutionary strands that have been consistently repudiated
by communist party-states and that play no small role in social
democratic and developmental thinking.
Temporarily at least, we are left with the neo-conservative
totem of the "free market," defined by a World Bank economist
as a small percentage of industrial production coming from
government-owned plants and a small percentage of agricultural
production flowing through governmental marketing boards." A
useful point is being exaggerated here: since public enterprises are
10. Id. at 15. He adds (id.) that: "For our purposes, it matters very little what strange
thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso." In Eastern Europe, they say that:
There is no "socialist democracy," only multi-party, parliamentary democracy, and no "socialist
legality," just the rule of law guaranteed by an independent judiciary. In large part, events
there reflect "the atomizing impact of developed consumerism, one of the most potent
weapons known to man." Ash, Eastern Europe, New York Rev. of Books, Feb. 15, 1990, pp.
17, 21-22.
11. Kaye, The Concept of the 'End of History' Constitutes a Challenge to thde Liberal
Consensus in Scholarship and inPublic Life, Chron. of Higher Educ., Oct. 25, 1989, p. A48.
12. Wallich, supra note 1, citing an unidentified World Bank economist. The "free
market ...is the latest Central European utopia," Ash, supra note 10, at 21. Shapiro, Richard
Posner's Praxis, 48 Ohio SL L.J. 999, 1006 n. 33 (1987) notes the "quite staggering offhand
confidence" of Posner's Economics of Justice 67 (1981): "It is almost the universal opinion
of economists (including Marxist economists) that free markets, whatever objections can be
made to them on grounds of equity, maximize a society's wealth."
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almost universally unaccountable, they are likely to be neither
efficient nor equitable. They tend rather to build an elite power
and thus an inequality. But the current passion for shrinking the
public sector through "privatization" often leads to a net loss of
wealth (welfare), frequently through such "leakages" as the
corruption and political favoritism that lead to further inequalities.
Yet Indians, Nigerians, and others are beginning to demand the
creation of a market economy, while the implementation of the
neo-conservative agenda in Chile has made it impossible to return
to Allende's status quo ante. 3
A free market ideology would replace government bureaucracy
with the "invisible hand" of individuals' self-interest that, critics
add, often amounts to some expert's or elite's sleight-of-hand. The
market is the original source of an economic pluralism, but all
marketplace activity - elite luxuries as well as housing for the
poor - is deemed indistinguishably valuable under the amoral
criterion of creating wealth. This criterion quickly becomes a
canon of distributive justice popular among neo-conservatives:
from each according to his ability, to each according to his
marginal productivity.
If rewards do not thus depend on
productivity, there may indeed be too few material incentives to
produce goods and services and thus to generate the economic
growth that may fuel future redistributions.
But markets
themselves do not redistribute, since productivity is measured by
the strictly allocative criteria of the willingness and the ability to
pay. The wealthy are usually unwilling to forego consuming luxury
goods, so as to reward the poor for their produce, and the poor
are unable to reward each other out of their poverty. Yet neoconservatives expect foreign capital, technology, managerial skills,
etc. to receive whatever rewards (fragmented and uncompetitive)
Third World markets will bear, or else prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation must be paid.
Government could transfer income and other resources such
as education to the poor, and then rely on generations of a
13. Tully, Correspondent's Report, BBC World Service, Jan. 20,1990,2010 G.M.T.; Paper
by Joseph Thome, INTWORLSA Panel, San Francisco, Jan. 4, 1990.
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marketplace efficiency to increase productivity in the things poor
people are willing and increasingly able to buy. This is the strategy
of a West German or a Swedish capitalism (or social democracy).
But for very different reasons, neo-conservative theorists and many
Third World leaders refuse to trust and to empower the poor. In
the many countries ruled through a complex balancing of elite
factions, a genuine empowering of the poor (as distinct from their
virtual representation by elites) would so unbalance the regime as
to make its collapse likely. Neo-conservative theorists fear that the
poor would use such power as they gain to procure the collapse of
markets by political means, markets which must be defended at
any cost. (This is a replay of Alexander Hamilton's fear of the
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Democrats.) There may be a growing
community of interest here: Some Third World elites will be able
to subvert the new "free" markets for elite purposes and then
blame the poor's plight on "foreign devils" like the World Bank
and the IMF, while neo-conservatives play along out of ignorance
of what is going on or from the belief that elites will do less
damage to markets than would the poor.
Admittedly, neo-conservatives are reacting to an excessively
altruistic model of development that has its origins in Whitehall,
the Kremlin or the Frankfurter/Landis model of a New Deal
liberalism: good people who are clever and well-informed (i.e., an
elite) can be given wide legal and political discretion because they
will promote the public or proletarian interest zealously. In its
extreme form, neo-conservatism denies the existence of a public
interest that is not a simple summation of the private interests
(arbitrary preferences) that are more efficiently agglomerated by
markets than by bureaucrats.1" Those Third World economists
14. J. Buchanan, Explorations into Constitutional Economics 61 (R. Tollison & V.
Vanberg, eds. 1989) (winner of the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics); Musgrave, The Public
Interest, in Nomos V: The Public Interest 107 (C. Friedrich, ed. 1962). See IL Dias,
Jurisprudence 504 (4th ed. 1976); Ogus, Law and Spontaneous Order: Hayek's Contribution
to Legal Theory, 16 J.L. & Soc. 393 (1989). In "traditional economics, government is
considered a nonproductive activity, an inevitable burden to be discouraged wherever feasible."

All "that the politicians ...decide is who is to be exploited by whom. The best guarantee
against exploitation is the market," since government "is always more available as a tool for
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who are trained to trust markets are seldom able to beat market
results by applying planning techniques and fads.
Neoconservatives have at least shown that many of government's
interests and values are so poorly defined and pursued in so
inefficient a fashion that they cannot be implemented at a cost the
public would and should accept.
The proposed cure is for government to mimic efficient
markets through deregulation, privatization, and the elimination of
subsidies, plus simple assertions of the validity of the "trickledown" causal theory of development. In legal terms, this is an
abolition of preexisting legal duties in the name of the (wide)
"open" legal system pioneered by Popper, Kelsen, and Hayek.' s
Traditional accountability mechanisms in law and politics are
thought to be unnecessary and dangerous because they counteract
abundant and effective marketplace accountabilities.
Entrepreneurs, whose importance is declining in other economics
theories which give greater weight to elite and organizational
imperatives, can be given their heads because they are subject to
market controls, but the absence of analogous controls in political
"markets" dictates curbs on governmental bureaucrats.
The neo-conservatives' would-be government is far more
utopian, contractarian, and libertarian than any seen in the Third
World. Government would be restricted to the "nightwatchman"
roles of providing background (property and tort) rules, and
enforcing the contracts resulting from marketplace exchanges.
the strong and the exploiters .... The "more the state grows, the more pressures there are
for it to grow even more. [Yet] a bureaucratic solution to any social problem can only be
regarded as second-best .... " H. Lepage, supra note 3, at 82, 101, 212.
15. C. VeUanovski, supra note 8, at 14; Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand?, 36
Kan. L Rev. 209, 245-46 (1988); Michelman, Politics and Values or WIht's Really Wrong with
Rationality Review, 13 Creighton L Rev. 487, 492-94 (1979). See J. Harbeson, supra note 4,
at 13, 224. This may be a Manichean view, of vicious state and virtuous market, but
neoconservatives have shifted the burden of proof to require that interventionists show the
market solution to be more costly. See L Lepage, supra note 3, at 84. Human nature is the
same in and out of government, but private market constraints are more rigorous than those
on government. In any event and even "in its present inflated form, the state is merely an
organization that produces and sells certain products, chiefly security and justice." Id. at 67,
88.
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This is the ultimate privatization: of public law. The "common
law" that would get applied reflects values of a nineteenth century
capitalism and individualism, but it has not accommodated
communitarian and "republican" values or the realities of the
mixed economy. Further, little would presumably change in
colonial combinations of common and administrative laws with
criminal laws, combinations used to defend an inequality of
privileged positions that are perpetuated in varying degrees to this
day. In any event, how could a Third World Government
decentralize an unstable politics, liquidate large chunks of a stillweak state, reorient itself towards markets, and still cause its writ
to run broadly among diverse constituents?' 6 Neo-conservatives
might deem this an irrelevant question, but leaders for whom a
physical survival may require their survival in office will be quite
concerned.
Neo-conservative rights are based on the inherent justice of
marketplace exchanges. The right and the good must emerge from
agreement among "free men," from playing your cards as they fall
and regardless of inequalities in the players' skills, wealth, and
bargaining power. Competitive exchanges will limit the actions
and the power of each relative to others. A multinational
corporation, for example, is merely a nexus for individuals'
contracts. These contracts limit the MNC's power internally, and
external limits come from the MNC's need to contract with
There is thus little or no need for
numerous outsiders.
government to control exploitation. (The neoclassical economics
of neoconservatism was formulated in 1880-1900, just before the
16. R.Bork, The Tempting of America 223-30 (1990); ILLepage, supra note 3,at 26,159;
X. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations 52-55 (1982); Cotterrell, Feasible Regulation for
Democracy and Social Justice, 15 J.L & Soc. 5, 10 (1988). See Jenson & Meckling, Theory of
the Firm, 3 J. Finan. Econ. 305 (1976); Ogus, supranote 14, at 399; Shapiro, supra note 12, at
1013 (quoted infra note 19). Democracy "is suffering from a fundamental internal
disequilibrium in which the benefits of public action are being concentrated and the
distribution of costs is being diluted. . . . We must frame a new political technology ...that
will suppress this disequilibrium ...and enable us to put the brakes on bureaucracy." IL
Lepage, at 18.
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massive growth of a private and public bureaucratization that it
thus accounts for poorly if at all.)
The neo-conservative expectation is one of government's
rigorous enforcement of broad property rights, so as to curb the
many forms of governmental intervention that serve to redistribute
wealth. This must be so because redistributions are thought to
make market allocations less efficient and thus to retard an
economic growth. Unfortunately, the other-worldliness of these
neo-conservative narratives gets forgotten when they are posed as
bases for reform. They speak of a society so simple that it can be
coordinated by isolated and fragmented contracts and markets, a
society integrated by a single code of behavior and one where the
self-interests of some almost never have to be subordinated to the
well-being of others. Third World realities are always going to
suffer in comparison with this ideal-type, at least in neoconservative eyes.7

As recent events in China show, it is not always or often the
case that "liberal" politics automatically follow a "liberal"
economics, or that market allocations are necessarily a by-product
of "economic liberties." But neo-conservative theory does give an
accurate picture of the functioning of the international "aid" and
trade arrangements that the neo-conservatives have recreated in
their own image. In these "negotiations democracies" but not
within the nation-states of the Third World, none are forced to
participate or to accept the outcome of negotiations. (Paretooptimal outcomes are thus unlikely because of the abundance of
opportunities to act as a holdout.) Wealthy countries will
negotiate to the extent that participation quiets their social
17. See K. Nagatani, supra note 6, at 53. A "state will grow more if its system of
property rights defines and protects, precisely and exclusively, people's rights to the fruits of
their own efforts." H. Lepage, supra note 3, at 72. Of course, this does not answer the
questions: who are "people" and what are "fruits." Further, the "immediate 'common sense'

answer to the question 'What will an economy motivated by individual greed and controlled
by a very large number of different agents look like?' is probably: 'There will be chaos'." Sen,
Rational Fools, 6 Philo. & Pub. Afs. 317,321 (1977) (quoting Arrow & Hahn). Hobbes would

add that life then becomes "nasty, mean, solitary, brutish and short," because of what we call
a lack of accountability and centralized management. See K. Nagatani, at 39.
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conscience and/or pragmatically furthers their ends. As these ends
revolved around a rolling back of the "communist menace" that is
now rolling back on its own motion, we can expect Western
participation to decline. Certainly none but the most altruistic of
Western nations will consent to negotiate under "preemptory"
international law rules such as those of the New International
Economic Order. Third World governments are also free in
theory to refuse to participate or to break off negotiations, but
doing this would leave most of them unable to export and to meet
elite consumption demands - conditions likely to lead to the
regime's collapse. Neo-conservative strategies have for years
revolved around the manipulation of East-West tensions. A
marked reduction in these tensions is likely to prompt a switch to
a neo-conservative manipulation of North-South tensions. The
hope of bringing order and accountability to a chaos of domestic
and (underdeveloped) international law rules thus seems remote
at present.18

18. 1& at 56; L Van Den Doei, Democracy and Welfare Economics 61-63 (1979);
Fukuyama, supra note 9, at 8; Shapiro, supra note 12, at 1006; and Wallich, supra note 1.We
used to contrast "socialist internationalism" with "bourgeois nationalism." But what

we have seen in practice is the rise of socialist nationalism and bourgeois
internationalism ... - IMF, NATO, GAIT, OECD ....[Ilf you ask what is the
basic, underlying model for the new relations between these [Eastern European]
states, and for the resolution of their outstanding national, ethnic, and economic
conflicts, then the answer is ...the European Economic Community - the one
and only, real existing common European home.
Ash, supra note 10, at 22. If this is what it will take in the Third World, ASEAN, the OAU,
and so forth are far behind the EEC. While many ASEAN members pay lip-service to the
NIEO, etc., the poorer members offer foreigners lavish (and often neoconservative) incentives

and guarantees under bilateral treaties, domestic laws, and agreements with particular foreign
investors. Raul Prebisch finds that there "is no dispute about the need for a rule of law in
world trade. The question is: what should be the character of that law." G. Meier, supra note
6, at 40 (quoting Prebisch). Unfortunately perhaps, the answer almost certainly is: it will be

of a neoconservative character, regardless of what it should be.
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But Everything Fails...

If neoconservatism is anything like the juggernaut I describe,

its opponents are relegated to probing for weak points in the
armor. The main chink discovered so far is the neo-conservative
admission

against

interest

that

market

"failures"

justify

governmental interventions. They quickly add that markets are
(assumed to be) so perfect that such failures almost never occur.
This is, in fact, their main bone of contention with welfare
economists, who see such failures as occurring regularly. Unlike
a utopian neo-conservative analysis of a preconstitutional choice
of rules, the focus of welfare economists is useful for pragmatic
developmental purposes: working within the "system" to get the

incentives right and to attempt to meet targets desired by citizens
and officials alike.
Arguing on the neo-conservatives' own turf, their critics can
point out that Third World markets are much more prone to fail
than are the imperfect markets found in the West. Ostensibly
holding everyone to account, failing or failed markets constrain
few or none. Principals are unable to hold their agents
accountable, and elite "agents" of the broader public can thus
accumulate wealth and power by ping-ponging between economic
and political sectors. Legal and political accountabilities force
some elites to be somewhat circumspect. But weakening or
abolishing these accountabilities in favor of markets enables elites
to flaunt their wealth and power, while fobbing responsibility off
on the "blind" market forces that serve to legitimate their robberbaronies. A failing market means that its disciplining, efficiencyenhancing functions are lost to the public, a loss that licenses
thoughtful governmental interventions. Market failures are proved
by demonstrating the falsity under the circumstances of one or
more of the assumptions on which the neo-conservative market
model is based: perfect competition in fully-integrated markets,
where everyone has complete knowledge of all alternatives, where
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all resources are fully mobile, and where there are no "spillovers"
"externalities," including problems with "public goods."' 9
There is little competition in a Third World market,
sometimes because of the public enterprises or regulations neoconservatives disdain but more frequently because the market is
"thin": too small because of a low consumer purchasing power to
support more than one or a very few companies at an efficient
scale of production. In such a thin market, imports (subject to
modest tariff barriers) or a governmental regulatory "jawboning"
are the only alternatives to consumers subsidizing corporate

inefficiency (or some other form of taking monopoly profits) for
a long time to come. The typical Third World economy is also
badly fragmented; as in ancient Rome, the economy typically
consists of reciprocity, redistribution, and market systems in
roughly equal measures.2 ° The persistence of such tendencies is
19. See R. Haveman, The Economics of the Public Sector 12-40 (2d ed. 1976); IL Lepage,
supra note 3, at 210. Market failures are "the overriding rationale for government
intervention. Market failure is any departure from the ideal conditions that would prevent an
unfettered market from achieving a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources." C. Veljanovski,
supra note 8, at 44. A spillover or externality is any incidental rendering of services or
disservices to those not parties to the "contract." These are situations where payment or
compensation cannot be exacted. It is thus "a divergence between private costs (which
influence individual actions) and social costs (which determine economic efficiency)." hi at
44-45 (citing A.C. Pigou). See text accompanying note 22, infra. For neoconservatives like
Richard Posner,
the existence of government is something that needs to be explained, ultimately
in terms of economies of scale and market failures. There is no room for a view
of a public sector having intrinsic merit or value, or of it having an historical
lineage independent of the private sector, the logic of all law is ultimately the logic
of private law.
Shapiro, supra note 12, at 1013.
20. See K. Greene, The Archaeology of the Roman Economy (1986). We can only guess
at neoconservative attitudes toward Third World "reciprocity" sectors, since theorists seem to
have little interest in or understanding of them. But some neoconservative studies of a
European feudalism offer important clues. These hold that serfdom was an economicallyrational response to the absence of markets and a money economy. Serf labor was therefore
not as bad as is popularly supposed; it "fulfilled the role of modem municipal taxes: it insured
internal order in the community." IL Lepage, supra note 3, at 46-51 (quote from p. 49).
Presumably, Third World subsistence (in good years) sectors are thus deemed inevitable and
thus useful stopgaps, pending the growth of markets.
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illustrated by the fact that this fragmentation inhibits development
in Italy to this day. Yet neo-conservatives play down the
difficulties and costs of the public good (infra) that is integrating
a Third World economy. The neo-conservative policy prescription
for building Third World markets by immediately and fully linking
them with (failing) international markets seems a recipe for further
disintegrations.
The market sector in most Third World countries is dominated
by the imported capital, technology, and (in some countries)
managerial skills that are traded in failing international markets,
and that are usually rewarded far beyond their productivity
because they can extract monopoly rents from failed domestic
markets. These rents are usually "earned" at the expense of the
poor, as are rewards to indispensable but usually invisible (and
classified as such in balance of payment accounts) foreign
middleman roles. The People's Economy, on the other hand, uses
family resources in efforts to make a living, without congenial
economic institutions, sophisticated infrastructures or extravagant
incentives.
The People, and their proprietorships and
cooperatives, are denied access to the market sector by their
inability to tempt scarce domestic resources away from following
imported resources in the pursuit of monopoly rents. In other
words, the invisible hand keeps the poor out of the rich men's
institutions and locked into low productivity and pay in the
informal sector. Owing to numerous market failures among other
things, the neo-conservative vision of markets as the "great
reconciler" among rational economic men is simply not a credible
theory of mass behavior in the Third World. 2
The neo-conservatives' market model assumes perfect
information among all players, and their hope is that capitalism
can be saved in the Third World by improving information flows.
But this turns out to be an extraordinarily costly policy, where
many people have never received or used market information
21. See R. Haveman, supra note 19, at 21, 26; K. Nagatani, supra note 6, at 4, 19. In
failing and unstable Third World markets, investments cannot really be based on concrete
long-term expectations, id at 32.
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before, or even seen others using such information successfully.
Media sources of such information are underdeveloped and
censored, and elites have the power to keep information and the
wealth it generates to themselves. Knowledge is power, and
redistributing it will be opposed by the private and public
bureaucrats whose passion for secrecy is a major source of their
power. The market model can thus exacerbate inequalities by
generating informational "barriers to entry," barriers which are
only partly accounted for by the political command over the
economy criticized by neo-conservatives. The high costs of
information in the Third World increases transaction costs in the
marketplace, and this causes a pro tanto reduction in marketplace
efficiencies.
Similarly, the neo-conservative assumption of an absolute
resource mobility, of resources forever on the move in search of
the best price, is belied by a variety of geographic, ethnic,
occupational, educational, licensing, and informational barriers.
Present in all countries, such barriers are higher and more
numerous in the Third World. These barriers mean that many
people and resources can do little or nothing other than what they
presently do, and they are thus unlikely to attain the use having
the greatest value to themselves and society.
A "spillover" or "externality" is a situation where the acts of
one person result in costs or benefits realized by another, realized
in ways which markets account for imperfectly if at all. For
example, unless restrained by government, a steelmaker will
produce pollution among other things and at a great social cost.
Yet most neo-conservatives will not even attempt to rectify this
kind of market failure; they would, rather, insist on a strict
enforcement of the steelmaker's "property rights," including the de
facto right to pollute. The less perfect markets are, the more
spillovers there will be; many costs and benefits will be unpriced
or wrongly priced and thus remain unaccountable through the
marketplace.
"Public goods," national security and justice for example, are
merely extreme forms of spillovers, things which many will
consume and which no one thus wants to pay for. The time-
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honored solution to the problem of public goods is for government
to provide them "free" or in a subsidized fashion, through a
compulsory taxation. But this solution is resisted by neoconservatives because it looks like an inefficient redistribution
from richer taxpayers to the poor, who cannot be excluded from
the consumption of some public goods. Economic growth is seen
to result from a private "internalizing" of these externalities, from
installing a burglar alarm or hiring a guard rather than relying on
the "inefficient" public police. This is nonsense on stilts in the
Third World, despite the fact that elites often hire guards, because
the vast majority of people are unable to pay to internalize one
externality after another. Collective "action, usually through a
government, becomes necessary if efficient performance is to be
secured."'
The mere existence of a market failure does not license
whatever interventions a political leader can dream up. This is
especially so when the market is only marginally defective,
although everything lives and dies at the margin in neoclassical
economics. It takes far less regulation to guide markets than many
Third World economists seem to assume. The information costs
of a market bypass surgery - planning, government ownership or
a quiet nationalization (joint ventures with government) - can be
higher than are information costs in markets; over-production by
government officials facing little competition can be as big a
problem as under-production by private monopolists and
oligopolists. Statist or thorough-planned strategies set up a heavy
presumption against market solutions, and neo-conservatives
certainly do well to set up the market ideal as a standard of
22. ILHaveman, supra note 19, at 38. See Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, in The
Theory of Market Failure 1, 5, 10 (T. Cowen, ed. 1988); supra note 19. I once heard a
neoconservative law and economics paper, in which the (male) presenter argued that rape
occurs because the rapist does not want to pay the price of a consensual intercourse, and that
criminal penalties should be adjusted accordingly. The first question from the audience was:
"Does this mean that every woman has her price?" The presenter reluctantly answered that
it must be so, in an "externality" theory of rape. So in Pakistan, where some employers beat
and rape employees who can be sent to jail if they complain, this neoconservative would
presumably devise better ways to price employee "services" and thus internalize this
externality.
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comparison for government actions in a mixed economy. But this
does not justify their attempt to establish a strong presumption
against government interventions, especially in the face of frequent
and massive market failures.
More pragmatic policies seem to be called for, those free of
ideologically-determined presumptions for or against markets.
Such policies can be made fairly plausible to IMF or World Bank
neo-conservatives as rectifications of market failures, even if their
reality is one of "constantly monitoring the economy out of an
unsatisfactory equilibrium."' A fairly explicit management of any
social transformation is needed in the Third World, where
politicians will simply refuse to trust such a task to business elites,
foreign or domestic. The adoption and expansion of markets is a
radical transformation; Eastern Europeans are only now learning
of the high costs of devising original solutions to unique problems.
A developmental pragmatism revolves around the realization that
everything fails sooner or later: markets, government programs
and enterprises, and ultimately governments and their
constitutions. The goal should be to minimize the net costs of
failure, while realizing that politicians will sacrifice everything else
before they will countenance a regime failure.
With only a bit of subterfuge, the reregulation of a Third
World economy can be sold to neo-conservatives as a selective
deregulation. A greater attention to market dynamics will often
show that multinational corporations are under-regulated, while
licensing, etc. requirements serve to over-regulate domestic
companies, proprietorships, and cooperatives. Reregulation should
tighten controls over specific abuses like fraud and promote an
accountability for the actual production of something useful, as
distinct from the manipulation of short-term paper profits and
losses. Public enterprises should be assigned enforceable tasks and
have some of these tasks split up; the "economies of scale"
arguments used to justify huge public enterprises are hardly ever
borne out in practice, and public enterprises have hitherto escaped
23. K. Nagatani, supra note 6, at 1. See H. Lepage, supra note 3, at 85, 95, 99; Sen, supra
note 17, at 320 (citing F.Y. Edgeworth); Wallich, supra note 1.
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accountability, by being empowered to do anything "expedient or
reasonably necessary." A "lighter" planning, one which pays
greater attention to market signals, can be instituted, and quite a
few countries are now experimenting with this. Almost any
"lighter" rural development policy can be justified as speeding the
lengthy transition to an integrated market economy, provided an
individualized land tenure is offered and the monopoly rents of
agricultural marketing boards are eliminated or substantially
reduced.
More pragmatic policies would have decisionmakers seeking
answers to a series of questions.
Will the outcomes of
governmental interventions be better or worse than market results?
Should policy-makers try to beat market results or to establish or
reform markets, and then allow these markets to generate the
desired results? To what precise extent is private initiative held
accountable by real-world markets, and when should public
initiatives defer to it? In particular, do real-world markets provide
too little or (what is more likely) too much reward for political
skills and productivity? What accountability-promoting reforms
are entailed by answers to these and other questions? These are
tough questions but, if the answers plausibly favor governmental
intervention, all but the most doctrinnaire of neo-conservatives
should understand the reasons for new policies. The main
weakness of this tactic is that it may reinforce a dichotomy
between markets and governments, a dichotomy irrelevant to the
real world of "maintaining the flow of goods and services and
keeping the government show on the road."'
24. Jenkinson-Neave, Policy, Planning and Markets, in Market Socialism 17 (L Forbes,
ed. 1986) (Fabian Society Tract No. 516). See H. Lepage, supra note 3,at 67 (quoted supra
note 15); Ash, supra note 10, at 21. As Brennan and Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral?,
74 Va. L Rev. 179, 188 (1988) warn, "the delusion that political agents are saints becomes
costly folly," But the neoconservative canonization of markets and of business elites is also
a costly folly, as costly as the delusion that the poor and powerless will be allowed to organize
things in their own interest For example, inflation is not a random event; it is induced by
those who benefit from it and who hold power in the economy. In part, these business
Gullivers succeed because of the companies and commercial laws designed for Lilliputians.
Yet tax laws and other government subsidies provide a free, no fault insurance against business
casualties, an aspect of governmental intervention typically ignored by neoconservatives. L
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Distributive Justice
Even if the neo-conservative agenda of markets for the Third
World is implemented, the outcome is likely to be a state
capitalism which exacerbates inequalities through rent-seeking
activities by elites. A right-wing regime may deregulate capital

markets but it typically retains a tough stance against higher wages
and labor's political interests, policies which receive tacit or explicit
support from neo-conservatives. There is no reason why an
undesirable distribution of wealth and income should not be

deemed a major externality arising from market failures, except
that neo-conservatives will not have it so. Like workers' families
during the Industrial Revolution, the poor and powerless have
borne much of the "social" cost of a transition to market
economies in the Third World to date. It may be ethically,
biologically, and perhaps even politically impossible to force them
to bear more. This point is illustrated in very different ways by
South Africa and by Malaysia,' which opted for growth policies
under a state capitalism rather early. A major outcome of this
decision was creating the structural problems that seem insoluble
by merely tinkering with markets and "getting government off their
backs." The economic base has to be broadened, away from the
property/ construction/stock market bubble and overprotected
heavy industries, and toward both higher value-added industries
and those meeting the needs of poorer consumers and regions.
The neo-conservative tautology of basing a distributive justice
on the willingness and ability to pay in the marketplace merely
Nagatani, supra note 6, at 64, 66, 124.
25. On Malaysia, see Joino, et al., Crisis and Response in the Malaysian Economy (1987);
Khor, Malaysia's Economy in Decline (1987); D. Snodgrass, Inequality and Economic
Development in Malaysia (1980); Brietzke, Development and Distributive Justice in Malaysia
(forthcoming). On South Africa, see F. Wilson & M. Ramphele, Uprooting Poverty (1989),
reviewed by Fredrickson, supra note 8, at 53: While South Africa exports food and supports
a very high standard of living for whites, it has the world's most unequal distribution of
income. A rapidly-growing population puts pressure on the eroding lands of an arid region,
and rates of infant mortality are among the highest in Africa. Nationalist government policies
have brought about this state of affairs, and "radical changes in... power relations ...are
preconditions for a successful campaign against poverty." Id.

118

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1992

means that a rock star gets paid more than a teacher because the
rock star gets paid more. The time for a "natural" redistribution
through a "trickle down" never seems to arrive. Admittedly,
Taiwan, South Korea, and the city-states of Singapore and Hong
Kong have managed both high growth and a fair measure of
equality in the distribution of income. But the capitalism in these
countries was heavily managed by dictatorial governments, which
kept "a lid on the welfare of . . . consumers by discouraging
imports, encouraging high savings and long working hours, and
limiting investment in such luxuries as housing stock." 26 The fact
that even dictatorial governments can compel a measure of
distributive justice sets it apart from many other forms of justice.
This is encouraging, especially as these economic feats are now
translating into serious demands for a democratization of the
countries concerned.
Neo-conservatives cannot take credit for Taiwan and South
Korea, and they can properly be excoriated for the possessive
individualism that ignores communitarian values and the extent to
which ostensibly efficient marketplace outcomes are dictated by
existing distributions of wealth and power. Defending property
rights against all comers has the effect, if not always the purpose,
of exalting the privileges of an economic elite, privileges which
limit the will of the majority and that of the political elite which
purports to represent the masses. For that majority, the neoconservative's universal goodness of the individual getting more is
usually constrained by concerns about concentrations of wealth
and power, and about society's moral ambience. 27 But these
26. Fallows, supra note 2, at 18. See G. Meier, supra note 6, at 58-78; Cline, supra note
6, at 374, 380; Wallich, supra note 1.
27. IL Nagatani, supra note 6, at v, 31; Michelman, Microeconomic Appraisal of
ConstitutionalLaw, in Essays on the Law and Economics of Local Government 137, 159

(1979).
The neoconservative Richard Posner assumes that wealth gets redistributed automatically
since, to enjoy it, you must share it with others. But what "is being maximized is the wealth
of those individuals who have the capacity to maximize wealth without reference to anyone
else, except to the extent that they are instrumental in that goal." There is no evidence that
a "triclde down" actually occurs. Shapiro, supranote 12, at 1007-08. Posner "hides from" the
"inegalitarian distributive implications [of neoclassical economics] by pretending that they are
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arguments may go nowhere if neo-conservatives have the power
and the doctrinal determination to make their views stick.
Government interventions, and thus administrative laws, must
obviously take the leading role, if the distributive justice ignored
by neo-conservatives is to be advanced. But the relevant formulae
of distributive justice are unfortunately imprecise and
controversial: to each according to need, how hard (s)he tries,
some other moral or social merit such as contributions to a
political stability, and so forth. A strong public sector and the
passion for a political control can easily swamp private economic
activity, even if politics is used to pursue distributive justice. Such
a swamping erodes a valuable institutional pluralism (infra), and
the operative formula of distributive justice too frequently becomes
"to each according to his or her ethnicity and political influence."
Many governmental interventions redistribute in favor of the
wealthy, as a perverse and formally-unintended consequence. For
example, the main beneficiary of a "rural development" project is
sometimes the construction company that builds the facility or the
merchant who supplies the fertilizer.
Many governmental
redistributions are responses to political pressures or to policies
which seem good ideas in isolation from each other. There thus
seems a clear need for the overarching industrial and agricultural
policy that only a few developed countries are now beginning to
manage.
The main asset the poor and powerless have is their discontent
arising from a relative deprivation of rewards (due to rent-seeking
behavior by elites). Their traditional sense of justice is usually
difficult to describe, but it often seems to revolve around
mere by-products of his scientific theory of allocation." Id. at 1046. Yet neoconservatives
can maintain with some plausibility that: "Improvement, what little there is of it, in the
relative situation of the underprivileged is attained at the price of a fantastic coming and going
of money ... for which society must pay heavy transaction costs (salaries of welfare officials
and so on)." ILLepage, supra note 3, at 125. Where the consuming masses have no value
to capitalists except as sources of cheap labor in, for example, a monocultural economy for
export, labor relations and politics will become strained, and the economy will lack "integrity."
ILNagatani, supra note 6, at 45. The economy then becomes a bit-player in the international
economy, a role "free trade" theorists would never choose for their own economies.
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something like John Locke's (not Marx's) labor theory of value.
Many governments try to avoid giving offense to this sense of
justice because it is the stuff of guerrilla movements, while no one
will fight and die to make the world safe for marketplace
efficiencies.
Given their unspecialized skills and lack of credentials, the
poor and powerless are particularly vulnerable in labor markets.
They are thus entitled to special protections, which can be sold to
neo-conservatives as investments in "human capital" (primary
education, health care, housing) rather than as species of a
consumption subsidized by government. Even then, the poor and
powerless will be unable to implement the powerful ideology of
equal opportunity for themselves, and they will grow ever more
mistrustful of elites bargaining for a cynical trusteeship over their
interests. In any event, a genuine equal opportunity cannot exist
where near-absolute property rights in key resources are assigned
to a few individuals, resources which earn monopoly rents when
they are thrown into failing and failed markets.
In sum,
distributive justice may be the only issue that necessarily places
neo-conservatives into serious conflict with those who take Third
World interests to heart. Trials of strength and subterfuge will
likely determine the issue.
Lawyers in This Brave New World
There is much more that can and should be said about
distributive justice, especially about issues unrelated to the
technical breakdown of markets, but I will move on to law before
the reader's patience is worn even thinner. What can lawyers do
er officio, when neo-conservatives would restrict them to defending
property rights and promoting an easy access to stereos and
VCRs? There are at least three roles lawyers can usefully play in
the Third World: troublemaker, ideologist, and planner. Lawyers
sometimes are, and always should be, trained and acculturated into
an institutionalized (infra) troublemaking role, an asking of the
hard and awkward questions that neo-conservatives and many
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politicians and bureaucrats would like to ignore. This role
amounts to a professionalized check and balance on economists'
and politicians' pipe dreams. Lawyers can force the dreamers to
become specific through the need to devise concrete rules which
can be implemented by ordinary mortals, and lawyers can give the
lie to marketplace dreams by aggressively representing the poor
people who get hurt by the outcomes of these dreams.
In particular, lawyers can constantly ask: What authorizes and
legitimates the application of a neo-conservative efficiency, in
preference to legal criteria such as fairness? This question
revolves around rights other than those of property (although the
property right of the poor in their own labor-power should be
emphasized), and it can be used to respond to the suffering of the
poor. If a lawyer does not constantly raise the rights and the
suffering (s)he is or should be trained to respect, other players will
forget them or relegate them to the neo-conservative conundrum
of: "How much are you willing and able to pay for, say, free
speech?" Needless to say, this is an unhelpful perspective on a
distributive justice; the poor are by definition unable to pay for
their rights, and government must therefore guarantee some
procedural regularities and some coherent balance between the
values of equality and those of the neo-conservatives' liberty.
Lawyers become ideologists when they seek to institutionalize
their troublemaking role. This is best illustrated by the German
lawyers' popularization of a Rechtskultur, an idea whose time had
come by the end of World War II. The Nazis had taken
advantage of a traditional duty-culture, much like the one some
Third World leaders have tried to inculcate with varying degrees
of success, so German lawyers saw the need to propagandize for
new institutions and public attitudes which revolve around rights
rather than duties. Attempts to promote accountability in this
fashion have largely failed in the Third World so far. Among
other failings, most Third World lawyers have made no attempt to
anchor their efforts in popular cultures. But this does not mean
that more energetic and creative efforts will fail in the future and
over the long run. Lawyers can now take advantage of a
worldwide tide of democratization and a neo-conservative fondness
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for liberal democracy, even if the lawyers' work-product looks
rather more like a social democracy. Lawyers are trained to
dissimulate, and they might as well use this training for a good
purpose: "Just as politics is too important to be left to politicians,
so too is economics too crucial to be left solely to economists or
perhaps worse
still to a combination of only economists and
'

politicians.

Planning is too important a role to be left to the politicians
and economists, or to a negation of planning by neo-conservatives.
Lawyers should, for example, advocate a planned redistribution of
rights and privileges, and of the wealth that flows from them. If
this is not done, a casual ("invisible hand") proliferation of
economic rights and privileges favors domestic elites and the
owners of imported resources. Neo-conservative and other
allocative institutions should always be linked with redistributive
techniques. These techniques can be so deeply embedded in
property, contracts, companies, and administrative laws, and even
in highly-visible constitutional and international laws, that only the
most alert of neo-conservatives will spot the techniques. A
redistribution of rights in this fashion does not merely redistribute
incomes, as the tax and "welfare" systems do; it redistributes a
control over resources which can be used to earn incomes far into
the future.
A complex and evolving economy is, in effect, a dialectic
operating among institutions, values, and incomes. This makes
distributive justice into a developing canon, defined in terms of
what can reasonably be done from time to time, and it shows a
dichotomy between free markets and central planning to be totally
false. Pragmatically, we would choose the combination of policies
that minimizes the net costs of market, bureaucratic, etc. failures.
The neoclassical economics of the neo-conservatives pays almost
no attention to the nature of institutions or of their interactions in
sectors other than markets. One facet of the lawyers' planning
role is thus to help design the right institutional "mix": ideal
28. Khor, supra note 25, at 154. See i.Haveman, supra note 19, at 43; L Nagatani,
supra note 6, at 50.
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"justice enters into non-ideal politics by way of the natural duty to
establish just institutions . . . ."" This is a task lawyers can
usefully perform because most of them give little thought to
adjusting the world so that it fits some ideal model. Dealing so
often with the world as it is, many lawyers know that the State is
the problem and the solution in roughly equal measures, and that
there are frequently worse problems and better solutions which call
for a sensitive balancing. Searching for balanced solutions, lawyers
can over time improve the "fit" of rules, sectors, and institutions.
In most countries, this dialectic of development operates (or
not) through seven institutional sectors:
markets; foreigndominated corporations, some with government participation;
domestic companies, some with government participation; public
enterprises and other regulatory organs; individual proprietorships;
cooperatives; and traditional farming, fishing, and handicrafts. As
a country develops and attains a measure of distributive justice, we
would expect these sectors to become more equal in size and
economic influence.
Such a pluralism helps foster growth,
diversifies risks, increases economic opportunities by increasing the
number of viable niches for the poor, and forestalls the dominance
of any sector(s) that create(s) rigidities and political pressures to
aid the sector(s) further. The flexibility of this pluralism means
that policymakers will not be forced to choose between a larger
cake with smaller slices for the poor, and larger slices for the poor
taken from a shrinking cake.
Acting like the handicappers of a horse race, lawyers have a
vital role to play in planning for an economic pluralism. In many
countries, it will turn out both that markets are assigned too small
a role and that misallocations caused by market failures have been
neglected. A creative reregulation seems in order, one aiming at
29. G. Meier, supra note 6, at 232. See Brietzke, supra note 25. Planning advice from
the bureaucracy often comes too late. It is usually too abstract to implement effectively, and
it is frequently devoted to one "true" paradigm, such as the neoconservatives' final, rational
form of society. Lawyers can thus play a useful role, particularly those who know that each
paradigm deals only with issues of interest to its proponents, that no paradigm solves all
problems, and that a complex, evolving truth (or economy) is best served by a competition
among paradigms. See H. Lepage, supra note 3, at 23; L Nagatani, supra 6, at 75, 153.

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1992
the maximum of equalization that can be achieved with minimal
losses in efficiency, at the curbing of rent-seeking behavior, and at
eliminating the barriers that keep the poor out of rich men's
institutions. Inappropriate foreign models of companies law
should be revised, with particular attention paid to the reregulation
of MNCs and of the property and stock markets where speculation
absorbs too many of the scarce resources that could find more
productive uses. Proprietorships and cooperatives, the main
institutional means for emerging from poverty, should be given
more congenial legal forms.
Coops have been unjustly
handicapped
and despoiled in many countries, 30 and
proprietorships are frequently subjected to many irrelevant
regulations.
An increased economic pluralism would also enhance the
integration of a Third World economy. Integration requires a
breaking down of the barriers to moving from one sector to
another, and a permeating of institutions by national values.
Absent such an integration, a half-hearted public compliance
combines with a private subversion of developmental goals, and
the poor will be unable to follow elites into national economic
loyalties.
Integration can be effected in part through an
administrative law shorn of its tradition of "muddling through," a
tradition which has too often displaced valuable marketplace
activities. Administrative laws should force the bureaucracy to
actually produce something useful and to control itself, under rules
30. Few countries have realized the full developmental potential of cooperatives. Coops
admittedly lose out in international competitions, and they are often unable to raise capital
in the marketplace. But they are less prone to swings in the business cycle or in planners'
fashions, and they are less likely to enter risky fields. Rather, cooperatives tend to produce
for less fickle markets of mass consumption by lower income groups, and to serve as
counterweights to top-heavy public and private enterprises. Their greater labor-intensiveness
economizes on the capital and technology that will always be scarce among the poor. Coops
make better and more consistent use of the less specialized skills of the poor, especially the
managerial skills we all possess in some degree. Cooperatives can thus be proving-grounds
for entrepreneurial skills, and they generate more equal income shares than do hierarchical
business organizations. Miller & Estrin, Market Socialism, in Market Socialism 3, 7-9 (L
Forbes, ed., 1986) (Fabian Tract no. 516). The coop laws of most countries ignore these
functions and focus on political control and the extraction of revenue instead.
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calibrated to distinguish the essential (the needs of the poor) from
the merely desirable: expensive elite leisure and tourism projects,
for example. In this way, all government policies and activities can
be forced to compete for scarce resources under a process
integrated by law, even under the lighter forms of planning
currently in vogue. Accountability is enhanced by bureaucratic
competitions and by matching a particular bureaucracy's power
with its social responsibility.
The lawyer's planning role is that of a generalist or
synthesizer, a role which requires lawyers to shed their positivism
and the many other formalisms to which the profession is heir.
Lawyers are trained to deal with rapid changes in imperfect
institutions, to eliminate contradictions, to help set politicallyacceptable priorities where contradictions cannot be eliminated, to
clarify matters by framing issues more precisely, to find the bases
for compromise, and to accomplish many other developmentoriented tasks. There is much more conflict in Third World and
other economies than neo-conservatives assume, and lawyers have
a limited but important role in building a consensus around
sensible policies. The neo-conservative forgets that people do not
live in markets; they live in societies. While neo-conservatives have
properly destroyed many of the illusions development theory relied
on over the past two decades, they have spawned a Brave New
World where there is little hope for the poor. Perhaps lawyers can
offer hope in meaningful ways."'
31. L Nagatani, supra note 6, at 44-45; Brietzke, supra note 25; Fallows, supra note 2,
at 19; Gellhorn & Robinson, The Role of Economic Analysis in Legal Education, 33 J.L Educ.
247,272-73 (1983). Theodore Schultz is right: "the economics of being poor" is "much of the
economics that really matters." G. Meier, supra note 6, at 2 (quoting Schultz). But poverty
too seldom provides enough mental stimulation for neoconservatives and many Third World
economists and politicians these days. The hope is that some lawyers will want to fill this gap.
When, according to M. Galanter, Competing Equalities xviii (1986), "we see large principles
illuminated by their concrete applications, we can observe the interplay of institutional routines
and inventiveness that gives law its kaleidoscopic sense of simultaneous rigidity and fluidity."
Paradoxically, the existence of numerous, seemingly intractable constraints often furnishes the
strongest stimulus for creativity, as much appellate advocacy (and medieval painting)
demonstrates. If this legal creativity is not forthcoming, the democratic ideal of an equal and
free pursuit of self interest can mean that liberty destroys equality as a result of rent-seeking
behavior: a concentration of democratic benefits, with the costs being borne by the poor and
powerless. See IL Lepage, supra note 3, at 18; K. Nagatani, supra note 6, at 223.

